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Justice Ginsburg’s International Perspective
Susan H. Farbstein
Assistant Clinical Professor and Clinical Director
Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School
T
he value of looking to international and comparative law, in par-
ticular on questions related to equality, is one important theme that 
emerges from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s twenty years on the Supreme 
Court. This perspective dates to her career as a practicing attorney. The 
first matter she briefed to the Court, in 97, included citations to two cases 
from the then-West German Constitutional Court. Justice Ginsburg has 
said that she did not expect the Court would cite these cases in its opinion, 
but rather hoped that they might have “a positive psychological effect. If 
our Supreme Court noticed what the West German Constitutional Court 
was doing, the Justices might ponder: ‘How far behind can we be?’” Since 
that time, she has helped shape our—and the Court’s—evolving notion 
of the place of international and foreign law in U.S. jurisprudence. Her 
years on the Court have been marked by its growing attentiveness to legal 
developments around the world, as well as a recognition that the United 
States should keep pace with these changes.
  While always cognizant of the fact that only U.S. law provides a bind-
ing precedent for the Court, Justice Ginsburg has provided a crucial voice 
for looking beyond our borders “to add to the store of knowledge relevant 
to the solution of trying questions.”4 No decision of hers better embod-
ies this approach than her concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.5 
After being denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School, 
Barbara Grutter, a white woman, alleged that she had been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of her race and sued to challenge the validity 
of the school’s affirmative action admissions program. The Court found 8
that the admissions process did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection guarantee, and that diversity was a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to permit the consideration of race as practiced by the law 
school’s admissions program.
  In her concurring opinion in Grutter, Justice Ginsburg relied upon 
international human rights law to support her conclusions, and in partic-
ular on two United Nations Conventions. Citing the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,6 she 
noted that “the Court’s observation that race-conscious programs ‘must 
have a logical end point,’ accords with the international understanding . 
. . of affirmative action. The International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the United States 
in 994 . . . instructs [that affirmative action measures] ‘shall in no case 
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for 
different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have 
been achieved.’”7 Relying further on the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,8 she noted that affirma-
tive action programs are permissible but must be temporary measures 
limited to the length of time required to achieve de facto equality.9 In 
addition, her dissenting opinion in the companion case of Gratz v. Bol-
linger0 referenced her use of international law in Grutter. Differentiating 
between invidious and remedial discrimination, she stated that “contem-
porary human rights documents draw just this line; they distinguish be-
tween policies of oppression and measures designed to accelerate de facto 
equality.”
  Justice Ginsburg had been thinking about affirmative action through 
an international human rights lens long before these cases reached the 
Court. In a 999 speech, she noted that affirmative action, both in the 
United States and abroad, is anchored in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights—and appropriately so, given that both affirmative action 
and the Declaration itself stand at the intersection of the civil/political 
and economic/social rights regimes. She described how affirmative ac-
tion programs aim to redress historic and continuing denials of the right 9
to equality, as well as to advance the economic and social well-being of 
groups disproportionately impacted by poverty, lack of quality education 
and health care, or unemployment. Reading the Declaration in conjunc-
tion with the two associated Conventions that she would later cite in 
Grutter, she stated that the documents “indicate[] that affirmative ac-
tion is not necessarily at odds with human rights principles, but may 
draw force from them, in particular, from the prescriptions on equality 
coupled with provisions on economic and social well-being.” Indeed, 
the Declaration’s social welfare theme aligns with the idea that a diverse 
student body could enrich the educational experience of all students. 
Article 6 states that public education “shall be directed” to “promoting 
understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or reli-
gious groups.”4 As Justice Ginsburg has elsewhere explained, “[A]ffirma-
tive action so directed might break down more barriers than it raises by 
enabling members of diverse groups to share in the everyday business of 
living, working, and learning together.”5
  Both before and after Grutter, Justice Ginsburg’s public lectures have 
championed the practice of looking beyond our borders for guidance: 
“The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I have urged, if we do not 
both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values 
and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.”6 She respects inter-
national instruments and the legal judgment of those outside our country, 
noting that, “Judges in the United States are free to consult all manner of 
commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or even law 
students write copiously in law reviews . . . why not the analysis of a ques-
tion similar to one we confront contained in an opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German 
Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights?”7
  American attorneys working on human rights issues, whether in the 
United States or abroad, find her willingness to consider the practices 
and logic of the international community especially valuable. As Jus-
tice Ginsburg herself has noted, this approach aligns with our history.8 
The Framers of our Constitution understood that the country would 40
be bound by international law and granted Congress the authority “to 
define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”9 Our first 
Chief Justice, John Jay, wrote that “by taking a place among the nations 
of the earth, [the United States had] become amenable to the laws of na-
tions.”0 In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court famously explained 
that “international law is part of our law.”
  Just as importantly, however, this approach signals our humility, rein-
forces the value of consultation and comparative dialogue, and recognizes 
that we have much to learn from others’ innovations as we continue to 
work together against common injustices. As Justice Ginsburg has so elo-
quently stated: “[C]omparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the 
task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are the 
losers if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate 
bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. For ir-
rational prejudice and rank discrimination are infectious in our world. In 
this reality, as well as the determination to counter it, we all share.”
m
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